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Introduction
Humans have now amassed a sizable knowledge of widespread, nonconscious cognitive
biases which affect our behavior and decisions, especially in social and economic contexts.
These psychological “shortcuts” can bypass reflective consideration, distorting our reasoning and
often leading to decisions which do not advance our own interests. We may, for example,
irrationally fear unlikely dangers like plane crashes, which kill only one person in 5,862, over
much more likely ones like heart disease, which kills one person in six (National Safety Council,
p. 37). Time after time, we reach for the remote instead of our running shoes, even though we
know that we would, in the long run, be better off if we chose to exercise instead. Cognitive bias
research looks for regularities in how we make these sorts of misjudgments.
Government can, and in America already does, use cognitive biases to change how
citizens act, most commonly with an eye towards promoting the wellbeing of the populace.
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, leading proponents of this technique, argue that using
cognitive biases to promote the best interests of the people is not paternalism as traditionally
understood but is rather akin to “nudging” people in directions which are in their own long term
interests (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003; 2008). Paternalism has historically referred to systems in
which the government makes decisions for the citizens and penalizes noncompliance on the
assumption that government is in a better position to judge what is best than are the affected
individuals themselves. However, with a few notable exceptions like Medicare, Americans have
generally rejected the so-called “nanny state,” and there is a strong current of libertarian rhetoric
in American politics. Thaler and Sunstein contend that leveraging cognitive biases can promote
the wellbeing of the citizenry without running afoul of ideological opposition to paternalism as
traditionally understood by simply making it more likely that individuals will choose the
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government-preferred course of action rather than mandating it (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, 1778). They call their approach “libertarian paternalism” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, title), a nod to
the disparate philosophies they seek to reconcile.
Libertarian paternalism is not without its problems, though. Especially in a democracy,
where the government must remain responsive to the desires of the people, using nonconscious
psychological effects to manipulate the behavior and preferences of the citizenry is a perilous
undertaking. In addition to damaging the general autonomy American libertarians consider a
core value of a free society, bias-leveraging policies also run the very real risk of damaging the
political autonomy of the voting populace. However, now that knowledge of cognitive biases
exists, policymakers cannot simply ignore it without abdicating their responsibility to govern
efficiently and effectively. As a practical matter, the mere fact that the tools of cognitive bias are
available puts pressure on policymakers to use them. Second, some cognitive biases change not
just how people choose but also what they actually want. A democratic government must
respond to the desires of its populace, but the issue becomes much more complicated if those
desires are themselves a result of biases leveraged by the government. Finally, the potential for
overreaching is very real; regulations which set the cost of choosing a non-preferred option too
high could easily lose the non-coercive openness that makes libertarian paternalism an attractive
approach in the first place.
Toward the goal of minimizing or avoiding these three issues, I shall present here ethical
considerations and policy guidelines for policymakers working with cognitive biases. I contend
that a democratic government is especially justified in using knowledge of cognitive biases to
promote pro-democratic behavior, conditionally justified in using it to accomplish ends
traditionally within the scope of government authority, such as protecting public safety, and
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unjustified in using it for any other purpose, especially in ways that would distort the political
process. I also contend that the government ought, on the one hand, to restructure institutional
infrastructure to avoid triggering cognitive biases where it is not permitted intentionally to
manipulate such biases, as in the hypothetical case of a default policy that a particular religious
text be used when swearing in witnesses at trial. On the other hand, the government also ought
to optimize the effects of bias where permissible, as it has in the case of 401(k) enrollment
regulations (see §II, below). I shall use the United States as an example throughout, but my
conclusions will apply equally, with minor adjustments to accommodate differing democratic
architecture, to any democracy which values the political autonomy of its populace.

I.

Theory of Democratic Government
In a democracy, the authority of government, by which I mean the justified power to

impose obligations upon the populace, derives from the consent of the governed (Locke, 1689,
§171). Citizens of a democracy voluntarily surrender certain freedoms to the government in
exchange for the benefits that government can confer, such as protection from violence and theft.
This contractarian view of democratic authority is uncontroversially one of the founding
principles that shaped the birth of American government (Declaration of Independence;
Federalists Nos. 37, 51). The ongoing consent of the populace is maintained via regular
elections and referenda, ensuring that the government remains responsive to the will of its
citizens.
Vital to the proper functioning of a democratic system, and hence to its legitimacy,1 is a
“feedback loop” between the actions of government and the actions of the populace. While a

1

By “legitimacy," I mean here justification for imposition of obligation by the government, but see §IV, below, for
a discussion of legitimacy as a scalar (rather than binary) property.
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degree of stability is necessary for government to perform its role, responsiveness to the will of
the people is the touchstone of democracy. The citizenry must be politically autonomous, which
means that they must be able to change government when government fails to act as desired, and
that they must have sufficient information about the government‟s activities to do so in a way
that is likely to bring about the results they seek. In the absence of this critical feedback
relationship by which the citizenry continuously corrects the course of government action, a
democratic government can claim no authority. Indeed, a system in which the people either
cannot affect or cannot know the actions of government could hardly be called a “democracy” at
all.
Hence government itself potentially poses a threat to its own legitimacy. Maintaining the
feedback relationship of course requires that the government not physically stop people from
voting, but it has more subtle implications as well. Dictatorships may hold elections but so
tightly control the available information, and thus the opinions of the people, that the results are
effectively meaningless. Self-styled democracies may permit only a portion of the populace to
be counted for political representation, as did antebellum America, or use intimidation (legal or
otherwise) to control the vote. Voting districts may be drawn to artificially concentrate or dilute
the political power of specific groups of citizens. These sorts of anti-democratic actions detract
from the legitimacy of the resulting government by depriving its populace of political power or
political autonomy. Because the sheer scope and power of government make it relatively easy to
dramatically skew election results in a number of different ways, interference in the political
process ought to be undertaken with great care to avoid political distortions.
A robust democratic government can, however, also intervene to help strengthen its
connection to the people, and hence its own legitimacy. Government can encourage an
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informed, participatory populace by, for instance, providing records and documents at its
websites, or by making it easy for voters to register. Of course, it is critical to any such
undertaking that the resulting regulations be politically neutral. While fine-tuning of the
democratic architecture will inevitably result in some political power shifts over time, such shifts
ought to come as a natural result of the strengthening bonds between populace and government
in the form of providing information and opportunity for political expression, not as a result of
manipulation of the system for political advantage.
Government could also take a more active role, going beyond simple promotion and
invitation. Elections could consist of individual poll workers systematically finding every
citizen, giving them courses in civics and economics, providing them with candidates‟ records,
and demanding that the citizen vote or be severely punished. Of course, such a system is wildly
inefficient. Thus there is some balancing to be done between resources expended on
encouraging informed participation and those expended on the other functions of government,
such as national defense or the court system. The duty of the government to ensure that it
remains responsive to the populace, and vice versa, is but one obligation among many, albeit a
particularly important one. Hence, the most compelling methods of promoting pro-democratic
behavior are those which are cheap, simple, and easily implemented.
Adjustments to existing democratic infrastructure make excellent targets for efforts to
efficiently strengthen the feedback loop between government and governed. Rather than
establishing new programs or overhauling the current system, policymakers can look for
opportunities to fine-tune what already exists. These sorts of efficiency-enhancing tweaks have
been thoroughly embraced already in other contexts via the movement into economic analysis of
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law, spearheaded by Richard Posner (1973).2 By considering the economic interests of the
parties involved in all manner of situations, the reasoning goes, policymakers can predict the
parties‟ decisions and adjust them by altering incentives. In fields like contract law and tort law,
where participants are often economically sophisticated, the approach has proven quite
successful. In other contexts, however, there is reason to doubt its efficacy.
Classical economics is founded on an assumption of perfectly rational self-interest
maximization which is increasingly being challenged by new research into systematic human
irrationality. Loosely grouped under the umbrella of “cognitive bias,” these effects are
predictable and statistically consistent distortions of judgment and decision making, when
compared to the predicted behavior of perfectly rational self-interest maximizers. A system
constructed on the assumption of perfect rationality will not function as designed when its
components are irrational. Where such irrationality is predictable, it is incumbent upon the
government to account for it in designing institutional infrastructure. In the next section, I shall
discuss cognitive bias in more detail and offer several examples. Then, I shall set out three
distinct problems cognitive biases pose for policymakers and, finally, offer guidelines for
avoiding or minimizing the potential negative effects of policies which leverage cognitive biases.

II.

Cognitive Biases
In the last few decades, there has been an explosive new wave of interdisciplinary

research into complex human behaviors, characterized broadly as “behavioral biology” (Jones,
2005) or “the science of human nature” (Fowler & Schreiber, 2008). Leaps in computing,
genetic analysis, and neuroimaging have opened new avenues of research which are challenging

2

See http://encyclo.findlaw.com/tablebib.html for an extremely thorough overview of the history of the law and
economics movement worldwide.
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traditional assumptions about human behavior. Among the most interesting results is the
revelation that humans are not nearly as rational as previously presumed. Instead, we seem
subject to a host of psychological “shortcuts” which sidestep reflection and, in many cases, lead
to seemingly irrational or non-optimal choices.
Researchers are beginning to see consistent patterns in exactly how people get things
wrong, and they call these regularities cognitive biases. First identified in 1972 during studies on
intuitive number representation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), cognitive biases are becoming
increasingly important in our understanding of human behavior and decision making. Interest in
cognitive biases is especially strong in the realm of economics, which classically relies on the
assumption that agents in economic interactions act as rational utility maximizers, calculating
expected benefits and detriments (usually in terms of monetary value), then selecting the course
of action most likely to maximize the former and minimize the latter. However, research in
many contexts has shown that this is simply not the case, and irrational decisions are not always
the result of stupidity or poor information.
One example is the “status quo” or “default” bias, in which individuals are likely to
accept a given default option, even where choosing a non-default option would confer significant
economic advantage. In a seminal study, Madrian and Shea (2002) examined the correlation
between enrollment in 401(k) programs and whether employees are enrolled automatically.
Classical economics predicts that enrollment in a retirement program ought to be about the same
at different companies, regardless of whether employees are included or excluded by default,
because each individual will choose the option that confers the greatest benefit. Note that the
process of enrollment or disenrollment imposes minimal cost, usually requiring only a form and
perhaps five minutes‟ time. Instead, Madrian and Shea found marked differences in enrollment,
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with an overwhelming (up to 66%) preference for the default option, whether it be enrollment or
exclusion (Madrian & Shea, 2002, pp. 1162-4), and other experiments have since duplicated
these results (Choi, 2002; Choi et al., 2003). Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 35) attribute this
difference to what they call the “yeah, whatever” heuristic, whereby many individuals simply do
not bother with even miniscule costs if the status quo does not demand immediate attention.
Another example of cognitive bias is “loss aversion,” in which individuals react more
strongly to losses than to equivalent gains, and the closely related “endowment effect,” in which
an individual requires a higher price to part with an object than he would pay to obtain it, despite
classical economics‟ prediction in both cases that the object ought to have the same value
whether one possesses it or not. Kahneman et al. (1991), for instance, performed an experiment
targeting the endowment effect in which half the participants were given a coffee mug adorned
with the logo of the university. The other participants were asked what prices they would be
willing to pay to acquire a mug, while those who had a mug were asked what payment they
would accept to part with it. Over many trials, participants consistently required roughly twice
as much to give up a mug as they would be willing to pay to acquire one (Kahneman et al.,
1991). Interestingly, the endowment effect has since been demonstrated in both chimpanzees
(Brosnan et al., 2007) and capuchins (Chen et al., 2006), suggesting that it is deeply entrenched
in human psychology.
Yet another example of cognitive bias is the “framing” effect, in which the way
information is presented can strongly influence the choices individuals make. A paradigmatic
study is Redelmeier et al.‟s (1993) paper on patients‟ decisions about treatment. Redelmeier and
his colleagues presented two sets of individuals with different but logically identical descriptions
of treatment efficacy and then asked them to choose whether to undergo the treatment. The first
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group was told that 90% of those who had received the treatment were alive after five years. The
second group was instead told that 10% of those who had received the treatment were dead after
five years. Perhaps unsurprisingly, patients to whom the information was presented in terms of
death rate were much less likely to undertake the procedure than those to whom the exact same
statistical information was presented in terms of survival rate (Redelmeier, 1993).
Still another example of cognitive bias is “anchoring,” in which those who are asked to
estimate a figure are heavily influenced by a suggested starting point. A favorite experiment of
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) is to ask their students to take the last three digits of their phone
numbers, add two hundred, and then estimate the year in which Attila the Hun sacked Europe.3
Clearly the number generated from the student‟s phone number is completely unrelated to world
history, yet Thaler and Sunstein consistently find that students with high starting points will
estimate the event to be roughly three hundred years later than students with low starting points
(2008, pp. 23-4). Similarly, attorneys and other negotiators have known for quite some time that
it is wise to initially demand a far larger sum than one actually expects to receive, especially
when arguing before a jury of laypeople who may not know how much the normal award usually
is. By starting with an astronomically high number, the negotiator can make large sums
demanded later seem reasonable by comparison to the anchor amount, resulting in a better deal
than he would have gotten had he initially asked for exactly as much as he hoped to receive.
Though this list is far from exhaustive, the final example of cognitive bias I shall discuss
is the effect tactile experience can have on judgment and perception, which I shall call the
“haptic bias.” Ackerman et al. (2010) find evidence that the sense of touch can affect decisions
in six different kinds of complex social interactions, three of which I shall discuss briefly here.
In one experiment, subjects were asked to evaluate a job candidate based on a resume which was
3

Thaler and Sunstein (2008) assure the reader the correct answer is 411 A.D.
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given to them on either a heavy clipboard or a lighter one. Candidates presented on heavy
clipboards were consistently considered more serious about their application for the job and
better qualified. In another, people were asked to rate the ease of a social interaction after
assembling a puzzle composed of either rough or smooth material. Social interactions rated after
the rough puzzle were reported as being generally more difficult. In a third, negotiators seated in
hard chairs drove harder bargains than their soft-chaired counterparts (Ackerman et al., 2010, pp.
1713-4).
These and other cognitive biases present significant opportunities for government to noncoercively, and perhaps drastically, increase efficiency with comparatively minor alterations to
existing institutional infrastructure, but the undertaking is not without its complications.
Cognitive biases could be leveraged in inefficient ways or, worse, in ways that harm the political
autonomy of the citizens. In the sections that follow, I shall set out three problems faced by
policymakers who wish to use cognitive biases to advance government interests and offer some
guidelines to consider when evaluating whether particular uses of cognitive biases are
problematic.

III.

Three Problems in Governmental Leveraging of Cognitive Biases
Leveraging widespread psychological predispositions is a subtle, often entirely

subliminal, method of altering behavior and thus seems, at least to some degree, to subvert the
individual autonomy on which democracy so critically depends. One can fight consciously
perceived attempts at psychological manipulation and even violent coercion, but a cognitive bias
which operates without the knowledge of the individual affected can be literally irresistible, at
least at the conscious level. Hence we must consider when, if ever, such leverage is appropriate
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in a government which respects the political autonomy of its citizens, as a democratic
government must. There are three distinct problems with which policymakers must grapple
when crafting laws and regulations which take advantage of cognitive biases.
The first problem we face is that we cannot unlearn what we have discovered and return
to our faulty assumptions of perfect human rationality, yet we also cannot indiscriminately
manipulate citizens‟ cognitive biases without running the risk of seriously diminishing individual
autonomy. A cognitive bias by definition acts without the knowledge of the affected individual
(and sometimes in spite of the individual‟s knowledge, as the bias blind spot shows; see §V,
below), so when policymakers consider using cognitive biases to alter people‟s behavior, they
are unambiguously considering intentional manipulation of individual decisions. Moreover, it is
not overt manipulation of the sort which government ordinarily uses to accomplish its ends.
Instead, tweaking cognitive biases is a very subtle method of accomplishing desired behavior.
Such action falls into an uncomfortable grey area between coercion and promotion,
leaving its role in governmental regulation ill-defined. We know, for instance, that the American
government may not force any individual at gunpoint to exercise regularly, but we also know
that the government may make it clear that regular exercise is a good idea through public service
announcements, school programs, and the like.4 Governmental inducement of subconscious fear
to promote regular exercise, however, would not fit cleanly into either of these categories.
Hence we must be cautious in implementing policies which leverage cognitive biases, lest the
government overstep its authority.
Yet the government also cannot ignore the discoveries made in the emerging sciences of
human nature without abdicating its responsibility to govern effectively, and simply as a

4

Politically attuned readers and parents of young children will know already that the current First Lady, Michelle
Obama, has made the fight against childhood obesity a top priority. See http://www.letsmove.gov/ for an example.
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practical matter, the fact that such tools are increasingly available puts increasing pressure on
regulators to adopt techniques which use them. Already, the current Presidential administration
is using cognitive biases in crafting administrative rules. The 2009 budget, for instance, included
a provision adjusting retirement savings procedure to enroll individuals automatically, thus
leveraging the default bias in exactly the way Madrian and Shea (2002) suggest.5 Indeed, Cass
Sunstein himself, one of the primary architects of the bias-leveraging approach, was in January
of 2010 appointed head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, a subdivision of the
Office of Management and Budget which is tasked with promoting administrative efficiency.6
Hence, we face the dilemma of knowledge: government can neither ethically nor practically
ignore the tools presented by cognitive biases, yet neither can it use such tools without regard for
the effects on the autonomy of the citizenry.
Further, it is often simply impossible to avoid triggering biases in one way or another.
Many government programs require, for instance, that there be some default state which
everyone is presumed to occupy until they act to change it, even if the default is negative, like
not being an organ donor or not being registered to vote, as is generally the case in America.
Once an entitlement program is in place, its beneficiaries will fight attempts to rescind their
benefits with tenacity strengthened by loss aversion. Government offices must have furniture,
and whether such furniture is hard or soft will affect the attitudes and responses of people in that
environment. In short, any attempt to refrain entirely from triggering cognitive biases is doomed
to failure.

5

See Foer & Scheiber, 2009 for both an overview of current efforts and a very thorough political history of the
subject.
6

For more information, see OIRA‟s website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_default/
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Thaler and Sunstein (2003) compare this problem to that of a cafeteria worker who just
happens to notice the eating habits of the students. She notes that the majority of the kids will
take cake, pudding, or other sweets if those come first in the dessert section of the line, but the
majority will choose healthier options like fruit if they come first instead. She knows that the
sweets are bad for the kids, and she knows an easy, cheap action she can take to make more of
them choose the healthier option. Hence, there are three available courses of action. First, the
cafeteria worker can put the fruit at the front of the dessert section, thus encouraging healthier
eating. Second, she can put the sweets in the front of the dessert section, encouraging unhealthy
eating. Third, she can alternate or randomize the order (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, p. 175).
Note that none of these courses of action selects a dessert for anyone. Every individual
student is still completely free to select the dessert he finds most appealing, healthy or not.
Instead, the cafeteria worker can alter the statistical distribution of student choice through a
minor change in presentation. Some will choose differently on different days, and inevitably
some will choose their preferred option, healthy or not, no matter how the desserts are arranged.
What the cafeteria worker can change are the choices of those without strong preferences either
way, the pliable middle. Thus she can influence without coercing.
Thaler and Sunstein conclude that the only ethically acceptable option for the cafeteria
worker is to put the fruit first. There is no way to avoid influencing what the students will select
because the desserts must go in one order or another;7 the cafeteria worker can only select how to
influence them. Putting the unhealthy desserts first would be outright malicious, intentionally
inflicting harm on the students. Randomizing or alternating, on the other hand, is simply
7

Though Thaler and Sunstein expand on this scenario throughout their later work Nudge (2008), including options
like setting up a separate table for unhealthy desserts or charging a bit extra for them, the average cafeteria worker
(and, by analogy, policymaker) rarely has control over that sort of comparatively large-scale organization. Because
this discussion focuses on cheap, simple actions, the various embellishments Thaler and Sunstein add to their
hypothetical in Nudge are not explored here.
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abdicating responsibility for the students‟ nutrition. Analogously, then, the government has an
ethical responsibility to use knowledge of behavioral regularities to structure laws and policies in
a way that efficiently promotes the wellbeing of the citizenry, especially where it can be done
cheaply and easily by making small alterations to existing institutional infrastructure (Thaler &
Sunstein, 2003, pp. 176-7). Thus, Thaler and Sunstein argue that if a government knows that it
can use the default bias to encourage saving for retirement simply by changing the way a
regulation is implemented, it is ethically obligated to do so. They call this approach “libertarian
paternalism” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, p. 176).
There is, however, a second problem. If our preferences are so much a result of these
minor quirks of environment or preceding stimuli, it is uncertain whether pre-existing
preferences can be said to exist at all. Ideally, a democratic government ought to respond swiftly
and efficiently to the desires of its citizens, but if those desires are inchoate or easily
manipulated, it becomes much less clear to what extent the government is obligated to respond to
or avoid affecting them. As an example, recall Redelmeier‟s (1993) work with patient
preferences. Patients were much more likely to express a desire to undergo a medical procedure
when presented with information about its efficacy in terms of survival rate, as opposed to the
complementary death rate statistics. A doctor who herself had high confidence in the procedure
and thought her patient ought to do it could choose to present the information in terms of
survival, thus subtly nudging the patient towards the preference she feels is in the patient‟s best
interest.
Hence, cognitive biases can actually change what people want, whether it be a decision
about medical care or government. As an example, consider the tumultuous history of the
inheritance tax. When an individual with an estate worth more than a certain amount dies, the
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government assesses a tax on the estate, known historically as “death duties” (see, e.g., Beatty,
1907). In the middle of the 1990s, when the inheritance tax again became an issue of political
contention, savvy anti-tax activists mounted a campaign against it which included relabeling it
the “death tax.” As a result of this effort, in 1997 the government enacted a law progressively
raising the value of estates to which the tax applied and lowering the rate at which the estates
were taxed.8 By framing the inheritance tax as a penalty for dying rather than a tax on large
inheritances, skilled political manipulators were able to dramatically increase public opposition.
While there were of course a great many factors contributing to the success of this effort,
America‟s struggle with the inheritance tax is an excellent example of the framing effect being
used effectively to shape citizens‟ preferences in a pitched political battle. The government can
use this and other cognitive biases to shift preferences in other contexts as well.
This leaves room for what Thaler and Sunstein call “choice architects” (Thaler &
Sunstein, 2008, pp. 11-13), those who are responsible for structuring the way in which decisions
are presented, to tweak not merely behavior but actual preferences. While Thaler and Sunstein
argue that such structuring of decision making is non-coercive, it is not clear that they are
correct. In fact, Redelmeier‟s (1993) focus was to draw attention to serious issues of medical
ethics raised by how a doctor chooses to present information to a patient when seeking informed
consent. In the same way that a patient‟s consent to a medical procedure may lack legitimacy
when given as a result of preferences manipulated by a doctor, so too can a populace‟s consent to
a set of laws lack legitimacy when given as a result of preferences manipulated by the
government. It would, for example, be inappropriate for a democratic government to make the

8

Currently, in 2010, the estate tax is actually not in force as a result of this odd compromise bill and its successors.
In 2011, the tax will return. See Robbins, 2004 for a historical account and an overview of the changes implemented
in 1997 and subsequent legislation.
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same sort of lexicographical change popularized by opponents of the inheritance tax because
doing so would alter preferences in a way that advances a distinct political agenda,9 about which
more in the sections that follow. Policymakers must be very careful that they do not use
cognitive biases to interfere with citizens‟ preferences in a way that diminishes political
autonomy, a danger Thaler and Sunstein neglect to consider in any depth.
The third and final problem is that virtually all actions can be characterized as economic
actions, and though Thaler and Sunstein recognize the breadth of costs which can be inflicted by
regulators following the libertarian paternalist approach, they fail to provide criteria by which to
judge whether a given burden on individual choice is impermissibly non-libertarian. They
characterize their theory as acceptably libertarian because it does not block or close off options,
but as a practical matter, it is not possible for government to completely block an option, only to
impose a very high cost for selecting it. We could, for instance, characterize the investment of
time and energy in robbing a bank, as well as the attendant risks of prison and death, as
economic expenditures on choosing a governmentally disfavored resource allocation. The law
does not (and, indeed, cannot) absolutely block or close off this option but instead simply places
so great a cost on bank robbing that it is, economically speaking, an uncertain and spectacularly
inefficient undertaking.
Similarly, it is conceivable that the government might make it so difficult to choose a
course of action it wishes to discourage that it would effectively require that everyone “stick to
the plan.” For instance, choosing not to participate in a 401(k) program might require a trip to a
single understaffed office in Washington, D.C. and a $100,000 filing fee. Perhaps policymakers

9

Although this sort of political influence often creeps into government policy anyway. See, for example, former
President George W. Bush‟s June 8, 2006 Statement of Administration Policy, which refers to the inheritance tax as
the “death tax” nine times in five paragraphs. Available online from the American Presidency Project at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24912
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might even require a period of incarceration, or characterize the filing fee as a criminal fine.
Indeed, Thaler and Sunstein acknowledge that the degree to which regulations are “libertarian”
exists along a continuum, and “there is a thin line between non-libertarian paternalists and
libertarian paternalists who impose high costs, procedural or substantive, on those who reject the
plan” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 30). In the sections which follow, I shall offer some more
concrete guidelines for policymakers to consider when evaluating whether a proposed policy
crosses this line.
Hence we have three problems. First, government cannot ignore research on cognitive
biases without abdicating its responsibility to govern effectively, yet it must also avoid using
these tools blindly lest it seriously damage the autonomy of its populace and, hence, its own
legitimacy. Second, cases where cognitive biases make it reasonably easy to manipulate actual
preferences, in addition to mere behavior, force us to question to what extent these preferences
exist at all independently of the environmental circumstances which shape them, further
complicating the problem of leveraging cognitive biases without unduly influencing the
citizenry. Finally, because leveraging cognitive biases can impose a range of costs for
noncompliance, policymakers must be careful not to overreach, lest libertarian paternalism
become paternalism outright. In what follows, I shall offer a special justification for using
cognitive biases to promote pro-democratic behavior and set out guidelines to help policymakers
avoid these problems when crafting laws and regulations in other domains as well.

IV.

Special Justification for Using Cognitive Biases to Promote Pro-Democratic Behavior
Policymakers are especially well-justified in using cognitive biases to promote pro-

democratic behavior. This is not only because it is precisely the potential weakening of
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democracy that makes leveraging cognitive bias an unusually serious threat to a self-governing
nation but also because humans are subject to a host of psychological predispositions which
continuously threaten to undermine egalitarian self-rule. Human psychology is not well-adapted
to promote democracy on a large scale. In fact, our psychology is not adapted to most forms of
large-scale social organization because early hominid societies simply did not have the means to
reach the requisite size. Until quite recently, evolutionarily speaking, human group membership
rarely climbed above roughly 50 individuals (Dunbar, 1993, p. 681), meaning there was virtually
no selective pressure in favor of nation building, let alone international and global organization.
Large societies simply conferred no advantage; in fact, a very large society can prove disastrous,
as evidenced by the collapse of the Mayan and Easter Island civilizations, among others.
Nonetheless, the basic human instinct for group living, combined with a complex system of
cultural exchange and ongoing technological advances, has pushed our numbers ever upwards
towards these sorts of large-scale organizations.
Hence, though natural selection has strongly affected our social predispositions, there is
no reason to believe that it has favored democratic organization. To the contrary, Somit and
Peterson (2005) argue persuasively that because our evolutionary heritage comes to us from a
long line of hominids living in small groups following the dictates of an alpha individual, natural
selection has for tens of millions of years favored the psychological traits (whatever those may
be) that promote power-concentrating social organization. This makes authoritarian government
the “default option” (Somit & Peterson, 2005, p. 9). This theory has significant underpinning in
the relevant literature on comparative psychology; it has long been known that primate social
structure is generally hierarchical, often with a single individual at the apex of the hierarchy (see
Bernstein, 2004; for macaques see Smith, 1993; for baboons see Hausfater, 1982; for bonobos
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see Furuichi, 1997; but see de Waal, 1989 on the internal fluidity of this hierarchy in
chimpanzees). It is thus reasonable to infer from such widely shared traits in our near
evolutionary relatives that a similar set of social predispositions exists in humans, and indeed,
social psychologists have identified some already.
Most relevant here is a strong tendency towards obedience to authority, even where an
individual may be uncomfortable with the task assigned. The paradigmatic example is
Milgram‟s (1974) study on obedience, in which subjects were told they were participating as
“teachers” in an experiment on learning which required them to administer electric shocks to a
“learner” (actually a member of the research team) in another room. When the learner got the
answers wrong, the teacher was instructed by an experimenter (the authority figure) to increase
the voltage. Though no one was really being shocked, the learner would cry out as though in
more pain each time the voltage increased. Contrary to the expectations of Milgram, as well as
three expert panels asked to predict the subjects‟ behavior, 26 of the 40 subjects were willing to
proceed all the way to the maximum voltage, labeled “XXX Danger: Extreme Intensity Shock.”
Milgram notes that subjects “were observed to sweat, tremble, stutter, bite their lips, groan, and
dig their fingernails into their flesh” (Milgram, 1974, p. 375), yet they continued. Researchers
have shown similar effects in other contexts as well, such as Frank‟s (1944) study which showed
that experimenters could lead subjects to consume great quantities of soda crackers, or Sheridan
and King‟s (1972) study in which more than half participants were willing to shock a defenseless
puppy at the maximum voltage when instructed by experimenters to do so.
Further evidence for Somit and Peterson‟s (2005) theory is provided by the tendency of
individuals to follow the crowd, even where the crowd is clearly wrong. Asch (1956) presented
evidence that subjects would make serious errors in estimating the length of a line if they heard
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other “subjects” (experimenters in disguise) make the error first, even though they consistently
performed well at the task in isolation. Sunstein (2003) documents comparable results from 17
other countries, including nations as diverse as Germany, Japan, Kuwait, and Zaire. In a similar
experiment, Sherif (1934) exposed subjects in a darkened room to a point of light which
appeared to move due to an illusion called the autokinetic effect. When asked individually to
estimate the distance the light had moved, subjects‟ answers were of course quite different
because the light did not actually move. When asked to estimate the distance in small groups,
however, subjects quickly converged on common estimates (though estimates varied widely
between different groups). Further, Sherif‟s subjects would stick to the group answers in later
experiments even when asked to estimate the distance without group input. Thaler and Sunstein
(2008, p. 55) offer many other examples of peer-promoted conformity, including a tendency for
teenage girls who see that their peers are having children to get pregnant themselves and a
propensity for college students to mimic the study habits of their roommates.
Thus, maintaining a democracy is a constant battle against “baser instincts” favoring
homogeneous obedience to authority. In the complex system of human cultural exchange, these
predispositions can favor a variety of governmental forms, from dictatorship to oligarchy to
plutocracy, but for simplicity‟s sake, I shall refer generally to such forms of government as
“autocracy” to highlight the concentration of political power which distinguishes them from
democracy. While autocratic propensities may have promoted survival and reproduction
millions of years ago in the so-called "environment of evolutionary adaptation,"10 we must now
fight them to maintain the organizational system we have come to prefer. The mere fact that an
autocratic system helped our ancestors survive does not confer political legitimacy upon it. Our
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See Tooby & Cosmides, 2005 for a more thoroughgoing introduction to the significance of evolutionary history in
the study of cognitive biases.
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sense of fairness, along with centuries of complex social and political debate, has led us to value
self-government in which each individual has an equal vote, and we have, over time, developed
sophisticated systems of governance which suppress, redirect, and channel instincts favoring
autocratic organization.
The American model of democracy, on which the bulk of this analysis focuses, is the
height of Enlightenment conceptual engineering. Far from instinctive, the American
Constitution is a complex product of rational debate and meticulous revision over hundreds of
hours, informed by years of experience under the ultimately failed Articles of Confederation.
Democracy has changed and developed over time to match our notions of what we want from
government, such as extending voting rights to those who do not own land, but at base, we are
still committed to egalitarian self-rule. Thus we desire a form of social organization different
from that to which we are most strongly psychologically predisposed.
Democracy is justified in undertaking the functions of government because the authority
of a democratic government is derived from the consent of the governed (Locke, 1689, §171), a
sharp move away from the autocratic default. Both rewards for prosocial behavior and
punishments for antisocial behavior are set by the populace to whom they will apply (albeit
indirectly, in the case of American-style representative democracy at issue here), thereby
justifying the lawful exercise of coercive power by the state. However, the entirety of a given
nation‟s populace never participates fully in every vote, all the time.11 Inevitably, there are many
who are waylaid by other obligations or who simply do not bother. Further, every voter
necessarily makes her decision based on limited information, consequently limiting her ability to

11

The American Presidency Project calculates participation in Presidential elections since 1972 to be between 49%
and just over 55% of eligible voters. Even the highest turnout in American history, during the election of 1876, was
only 81.8%, leaving out nearly a fifth of those able to vote. See http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/turnout.php
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produce the outcome she most prefers. In short, the self-imposed governance of a democracy
derives its authority from an abstract principle of well-informed popular participation which is,
in reality, never fully achieved. Thus the legitimacy of a democratic government exists along a
continuum defined by how well it approximates this ideal.
Democratic government, then, is uniquely justified in using cognitive biases to promote
pro-democratic behavior because such use helps counteract our inherited autocracy-promoting
tendencies, facilitating informed participation and, hence, bolstering the legitimacy of the
resulting government, all without unduly or coercively interfering with the political autonomy of
the citizenry. We can, in effect, “fight fire with fire” by using cognitive biases to blunt the
effects of psychological predispositions which Somit and Peterson (2005) fear might undermine
democracy. Take the default bias as an example. A tendency to accept the default is a tendency
to acquiesce to the authority of those who set the default, 12 which could easily contribute to the
perpetuation of autocratic rule. In America, one must register in order to vote, making
nonregistration the default and hence encouraging passive acquiescence to the political status
quo. 13 The information needed to register a voter is quite basic and the form takes very little
time, yet almost 30% of America‟s voting-age populace is currently unregistered (U.S. Census
Office, 2010, p. 1). This raises a barrier to political participation and ultimately diminishes the
legitimacy of the government. Voter registration drives may help, but any such undertaking
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Indeed, the electoral advantages of incumbency are well known to political scientists. See, e.g., Erikson, 1971.
Some jurisdictions even go so far as to note on the actual ballot which candidate is the incumbent.
13

Unless one is a resident of North Dakota. See http://www.nd.gov/sos/electvote/voting/vote-history.html for a
history of this interesting legislative quirk.
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necessarily must fight the inertia of the default bias because, by default, citizens are
unregistered.14
Here, then, is an excellent opportunity to fight fire with fire by leveraging the default bias
the other way. Policymakers could, for example, automatically register voters when collecting
information for other purposes, such as state-issued identification, and provide an opt-out for
those who prefer to remain unregistered. While privacy advocates and small government
activists could legitimately complain that compulsory registration is intrusive, inclusion of an
easily chosen opt-out leaves an alternative for those who prefer to remain unregistered while
nonetheless increasing registration across the populace as a whole. Leveraging bias is an
especially attractive technique to increase voter participation because it avoids the “noise”
problems of compulsory voting, in which voters who are merely avoiding a penalty rather than
expressing legitimate political preferences15 can skew election results. Those who would
otherwise check random names on the ballot are free to go about their business as usual on
election day if they like.
Importantly, government can also help diminish the effects of biases which affect
political decisions. Druckman (2001) offers evidence that expert advice and discussion can help
to mitigate framing effects, which is particularly important in an era when politicians are
increasingly adopting the techniques of advertisers who have honed framing manipulation to a
fine, and very profitable, art. The government can and does maintain organizations of
independent experts, such as the President‟s Council on Bioethics or the National Oceanic and
14

Note that it is not voluntary non-participation which detracts from the legitimacy of the government, but rather it
is systemic barriers to participation. Of course, individuals must be free to abstain from the political process if they
so desire, but being registered to vote does not require that one vote; it merely provides the opportunity to do so.
Being unregistered, on the other hand, denies a citizen even the opportunity to participate. Hence, barriers to
registration detract from democratic legitimacy in a way that voluntary non-participation does not.
15

Known to compulsorily voting Australians as a “donkey voter,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donkey_vote
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Atmospheric Administration, to advise both government and populace on matters of political
importance, which, in addition to keeping the public informed, helps mitigate framing effects
which might be imposed by other sources. As a somewhat simpler example of cognitive biases
the government can mitigate, Koppell and Steen (2004) offer evidence that simply being listed
first on a ballot gives a candidate an advantage of about 3.5% of the vote (though the effect
diminishes significantly when the candidates are well known). The government could, at
relatively little added expense, produce multiple versions of ballots to balance this small
deviation. Indeed, the increasing prevalence of electronic voting reduces the cost of including
alternate ballot designs to nearly zero, making this an excellent target for efforts to efficiently
diminish undesirable bias effects.
Hence, democratic government is most strongly justified in using cognitive biases when
it acts to strengthen its bond with its citizens because it is fighting fire with fire, leveraging
psychological propensities in novel ways to moderate the effects of other, undesirable
psychological propensities. However, the fact that the government is uniquely justified in
leveraging cognitive bias in the context of promoting pro-democratic behavior does not give it
carte blanche to indiscriminately manipulate political behavior generally. Note that it is critical
that the government refrain from manipulating voter viewpoint or voting tendency via cognitive
biases or otherwise, about which more in §VI. Note also that the political and efficacy
considerations set forth in §V below ought to be weighed in this context as well, though a prodemocratic purpose may tip the scales in favor of permitting the use of cognitive biases where
such use might otherwise be deemed imprudent.
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V.

Conditional Justification in Domains Traditionally Reserved to Government Authority
In domains traditionally reserved to government authority, such as public safety or

enforcement of contracts, 16 we find the most problematic situation because use of cognitive
biases has no clearly defined place in the policymakers‟ toolbox. In the context of governmental
interests justifying violent coercion, we are faced with the question of whether using cognitive
biases constitutes prevention or punishment. If the former, then such use falls cleanly into the
same category as neighborhood watches and anonymous tip lines. If the latter, such use may
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, punishing individuals
neither convicted nor even accused of a crime. In the context of governmental interests which
justify only encouragement, we must determine whether using cognitive biases constitutes
promotion or coercion. These distinctions are unfortunately muddied further still by the youth of
the relevant sciences. We can, however, begin to formulate some guidelines going forward,
which I shall separate into issues of politics and issues of efficacy.
With regard to issues of politics, remember that problems arise in leveraging cognitive
biases to accomplish governmental goals because such biases are involuntary and routinely
subconscious. Therefore, the first condition which must be met in using cognitive biases to
advance governmental goals is transparency. Transparency in a democracy generally helps
ensure that governmental action really is the intent of the populace, but transparency is especially
important where the governmental action being undertaken is manipulative at the unconscious
level. Indeed, researchers have identified a cognitive bias against recognizing that one is being
or has been affected by a cognitive bias, known as the “bias blind spot” (Pronin & Kugler, 2006).
16

An exploration of exactly which domains have traditionally been considered within the purview of the American
government‟s authority is far too involved and technical a task to be undertaken here, but most of the relevant
domains are so well-established as to be obvious, such as protection of property interests or national defense. Legal
analysis of historical precedent is the appropriate avenue of inquiry here, though see §VI, below, for a more detailed
discussion of precedent as a criterion for evaluating bias-leveraging regulation.
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Thus it is critical to communicate clearly to the populace what sort of bias is being leveraged,
how it is being done, and what purpose the government seeks to advance by doing so.17
For example, policymakers might decide that furniture intended for visitors to IRS offices
ought to be soft, using the haptic bias to nudge people towards simply paying the expected
amount when they might otherwise contest small details. While this is likely to have only a
small effect, anti-tax advocates or civil rights watchdogs could reasonably complain that such a
regulation inappropriately distorts the perceptions of taxpayers visiting the offices by causing
some of them to pay more in taxes than is legally required. No matter what the ultimate decision
may be, the policy ought to be subjected to the scrutiny of the voting public, as with virtually all
policies of a democracy.18 Transparency is especially important here, however, because the
average IRS visitor is probably unlikely to notice that the chairs are particularly soft and even
less likely to associate that fact with a willingness to accept less favorable terms in negotiations.
Without governmental transparency, leveraged cognitive biases could easily be all but invisible
to the populace, leaving them with no opportunity to shape the relevant policies.
Second, when deciding how to use a given bias, policymakers also ought to consider the
ease with which a given bias can be overcome by the affected individual, and a useful metric
here is the context in which the decision to be affected is being made. Fleeting interactions
which would ordinarily command little attention are simultaneously the least likely context in
which bias effects will be noticed and the context in which they may have the greatest impact.
Some biases, however, such as the anchoring effect, remain effective even in reflective decision
17

Interestingly, the very blind spot which makes it so important that government acknowledge leveraging of
cognitive bias also ensures that such transparency will not significantly detract from the efficacy of the program.
Knowing that one is in a situation which will trigger a cognitive bias usually does little to prevent it from being
triggered. Again, see Pronin & Kugler, 2006.
18

I say “virtually all policies” because there are a few narrow exceptions to this rule, such as sensitive national
security information. The complex question of precisely which policies may legitimately be withheld from citizen
review is a problem left unexplored here.
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making. Thus the context in which a bias is expected to act must be weighed in deciding
whether to go forward. Generally, easily overcome biases active in a context permitting
reflection and consideration may be used more freely than entrenched biases active in a context
requiring swift action.
As an example of the importance of context, consider the opposing contexts of a bias
leveraged in automobile traffic and, alternatively, the same bias leveraged in the way a
government form is structured. In traffic, the affected individual is processing a great deal of
information at one time, much of it critical to avoiding injury or death. There are few cognitive
resources available for a driver to dedicate to analyzing potential nonconscious psychological
effects, and little time in which to do so as well. Filling out a form, however, provides more
opportunity for reflection and analysis, which will generally give individuals a better chance to
identify and compensate for potential bias effects, though the leveraged bias may nonetheless
affect them. Consider also the framing effect as compared to the default bias as an example of
the importance of bias entrenchment. The framing effect, as demonstrated by Redelmeier et al.
(1993), remains effective even during the sort of reflective decision making undertaken by
patients whose lives are at stake. The default bias, on the other hand, can be overcome through
careful consideration, as demonstrated by the many people Madrian and Shea (2002) found to
have enrolled in 401(k) programs even where disenrollment was the default. Thus, the ease with
which an ordinary individual may overcome a particular bias leveraged in a given context ought
to be considered when crafting policy.

27

As a final political matter, government must consider whether a fundamental right19 is
implicated by a given use of cognitive biases. As with any other technique, a significant burden
on the exercise of a fundamental right would be an impermissible impact of a regulation using
cognitive bias. For instance, policymakers might leverage the status quo bias to discourage new
gun purchases in the name of protecting public safety, but the Supreme Court has over the last
few years increasingly moved towards explicit recognition of the right to bear arms as a
fundamental right (see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___ [2008] and McDonald v.
Chicago, 554 U.S. ___ [2010]) and could reasonably take exception to a law leveraging bias to
burden that right. Any such regulation would have to be, in line with Supreme Court
jurisprudence, narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest (see, e.g.,
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 [2006] for a recent
articulation and application of this “strict scrutiny” in the context of free exercise of religion).
Cognitive biases emphatically should not be used to expand government power into areas
traditionally beyond its reach, about which more in §VI, below.
Matters of efficacy are to be judged by the relevant sciences. While it would be
premature and unwise to set a definitive threshold for use in advance of the relevant research, it
is safe to say that a given bias must first be scientifically well established before the government
ought to make use of it (or attempt to mitigate it). This guideline helps avoid unintended
consequences of regulation, as well as expenditures on institutional infrastructure changes which
have little effect. Again, the duty of the government to leverage cognitive biases in constructing
laws hinges on efficiency. If there is little evidence that leveraging a given bias increases the
effectiveness of government intervention, there is of course no duty to use it.
19

“Fundamental right” is a term of art in American jurisprudence, referring generally to rights found in the Bill of
Rights. Among them are the right to free speech, the right to free exercise of religion, and, notably, the implicit
right to privacy.
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As a second matter of efficacy, leveraged cognitive biases also ought to meet a minimum
threshold of reliability. Obviously it is likely to be of extraordinarily little utility to leverage
cognitive biases which only work 1% of the time, even if such biases are well-supported in the
literature. Leveraged biases also must be widespread in the population if they are to serve as
useful regulatory tools, which is one of the reasons evolutionary psychology is so often linked to
the study of cognitive biases. Evolutionary psychology finds deeply entrenched predispositions
that are likely to be very widespread in the population due to many, many years of selection for
the trait.20 If a bias acts rarely or is present in only a small portion of the population,
policymakers usually ought to ignore it merely as a matter of efficiency.
Thus there are five factors policymakers should consider when leveraging cognitive
biases in domains traditionally reserved to government authority. As political matters,
policymakers must be transparent about their use of cognitive biases, consider the ability of
individuals to compensate for the bias being leveraged, and refrain from burdening fundamental
rights even coincidentally. Unless these conditions are met, the government runs the very real
risk of diminishing the political autonomy of its citizens. As matters of efficacy, policymakers
must be sure that a given bias is scientifically well established and also that it acts regularly
enough in a large enough portion of the populace that it can be usefully employed to accomplish
the desired result. Without these assurances, the government could easily waste time and money
on inefficient actions or, worse, unwittingly damage the citizens‟ political autonomy by
leveraging biases which are poorly understood. In what follows, I shall discuss the limits of
leveraging cognitive biases and the duty of the government to re-evaluate existing policies which
trigger cognitive biases.

20

Again, see Tooby & Cosmides, 2005 for a more thoroughgoing introduction to the significance of evolutionary
history in the study of cognitive biases.
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VI.

Unjustified in Other Domains & the Duty to Re-Evaluate Existing Biases
Governmental use of cognitive biases to affect behavior which is not within domains

traditionally reserved to government ought to be broadly prohibited to prevent government
overreaching. Leveraging of cognitive biases is not a tool for the government to extend its
power beyond its current scope, nor should it be. Actions prohibited to government through
ordinary means remain prohibited in this context as well, and bias-leveraging regulations
affecting citizens‟ political autonomy are the most objectionable. It is not difficult to envision
the use of cognitive biases to subtly and systematically disadvantage a particular political
ideology or social class. The anchoring effect, for example, could be used to manipulate the tax
burden economically unsophisticated citizens are willing to impose upon themselves by shifting
the range of debate up or down. In an outrageous power grab, the ruling party might leverage the
default bias in their favor by requiring that all uncast votes be counted as votes for their
candidates. More subtly, agencies making information about government actions available to the
people could leverage the framing effect to alter popular perception of the data to the advantage
of some political faction. Taxes might be presented as yearly gains (refunds) rather than monthly
losses (withholding), leveraging loss aversion to diminish opposition to increases. The
possibilities for abuse are vast, and they will continue to grow as research goes forward.
Note however that leveraging cognitive biases may ultimately prove so powerful a
regulatory tool that government will be able to undertake functions previously thought simply
impossible. The scope, pervasiveness, and subtlety of cognitive bias may be brought to bear on
problems previously unsolvable yet nonetheless recognized as within the purview of legitimate
government authority. Subject to the considerations set forth in §V, above, we ought not prevent
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policymakers from pursuing important and formerly impossible goals simply because the
government must use the new tools of cognitive bias to accomplish them.
For instance, the government could permissibly leverage cognitive biases towards the
goal of completely eliminating transmissible diseases under the state power to protect public
health, safety, and welfare. The public health power of the government has long been recognized
by the judiciary as extraordinarily broad (see Hodge & Gostin, 2002 for a historical overview of
the public health power in the context of mandated vaccines), and though such a task has never
been undertaken because of practical limitations, policymakers would not be overstepping by
using the tools of cognitive bias in the attempt. 21 Government may take on unprecedented tasks
which are nonetheless within the traditional understanding of government authority, and this
should be distinguished from an undertaking which seeks to effect an outcome which is itself
outside the traditional scope of government authority.
As a final note, knowledge of cognitive biases imposes a duty on the government to avoid
biases where it is not explicitly using them for some permitted purpose and to compensate for
cognitive biases where they cannot be avoided. There are likely a great many regulatory and
administrative elements which trigger biases simply because the architects did not have the
knowledge to avoid them, and as research reveals these effects, policymakers ought to set about
correcting them. Biases of course ought to be optimized when, as a result of simple ignorance in
administrative design, they are active in non-optimal ways within permissible domains, but there
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Regrettably, I have not devised a way to eliminate transmissible diseases using cognitive biases. I have selected
this example for two reasons. First, the power to protect public health, safety, and welfare has a long legal history
establishing its great breadth, meaning even public health actions of unprecedented scope may well be upheld by the
courts if challenged. Again, see Hodge & Gostin, 2002. Second, it is precisely because it is so difficult to envision
this sort of use of cognitive bias that I feel compelled to discuss unprecedented actions which are nonetheless still
within the traditional domains of government power. My point is that important tasks ought not be foreclosed
simply because they were formerly impossible or even unimaginable without the tools presented by research into
cognitive biases.
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are two contexts in which policymakers ought to eliminate bias if possible and to minimize its
effects if not.
First, bias-affecting administrative architecture which significantly affects areas outside
the permissible scope of government authority demands first attention. For instance, it is
imperative to eliminate or compensate for biases which favor a particular candidate or political
party, as well as those which burden a fundamental right. While ignorance excuses the initial
establishment of features which impermissibly affect biases, ongoing research demands a
government response. Rooting out the unknown bias-triggering elements lurking in government
infrastructure is sure to be a time-consuming process, but the response must be exceptionally
swift and thorough where these elements affect the political autonomy of the populace.
Second, policymakers may wish to offer citizens legitimately neutral options with the
intention that the citizens choose for themselves, free from the influence of cognitive biases.
Though the policymakers may be permitted to manipulate biases in the relevant domain, it is
possible that they might simply find it prudent to refrain from doing so. In these contexts, the
effects of cognitive biases can actually subvert the intent of those who developed the policy.
Here, then, it is prudent to remove or minimize the effects of bias in order to align the policy
more closely with the intent of its crafters. Reviewing existing regulations for bias-triggering
elements in domains in which the government is permitted to leverage cognitive biases, however,
is merely a good idea (because it promotes efficiency) rather than a moral imperative (because it
does not threaten political autonomy) and, accordingly, ought to be a lower priority than rooting
out biases operating in prohibited domains.
In short, policymakers ought not apply the tools of cognitive bias to expand government
power beyond its current bounds, but this limitation ought not be construed to forbid ambitious
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or unprecedented actions which are nonetheless within the scope of government authority as
traditionally understood. Further, the government has a duty to re-evaluate existing policy
architecture for aspects which might trigger cognitive biases and to optimize, minimize, or
eliminate them, especially biases active in domains in which the government is not permitted
intentionally to manipulate them. In the next and final section, I shall offer a summary of my
research and conclusions.

VII.

Conclusion
Research on cognitive biases has revealed a number of tools which can enable

policymakers to increase operational efficiency, promote the general wellbeing of the populace,
and strengthen the ties between government and governed. Proponents of leveraging cognitive
biases contend that the technique avoids widespread American antipathy towards paternalism
while nonetheless altering large scale behavior, but policymakers must be careful to keep this
central value in mind when crafting regulations, lest they betray the very core of the libertarian
paternalist approach. The temptation to overreach becomes especially dangerous where, as here,
the methods of government manipulation at issue are virtually impossible for those affected to
resist or even detect.
Leveraging cognitive biases presents three distinct problems. First, knowledge of
cognitive biases imposes a duty on policymakers to use them to make government operations as
efficient as possible, but the nonconscious nature of bias effects demands caution in choosing
where and how to leverage them. Second, biases can affect preferences in addition to behavior,
which complicates the democratic government‟s task of responding to citizens‟ desires, as those
desires could be the result of government-leveraged bias. Finally, policymakers must be careful
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that they do not impose too high a burden on those who wish to depart from the governmentapproved plan, lest the nudge of cognitive bias devolve into a mandate. These are not, however,
insurmountable obstacles.
Problems can be minimized or avoided altogether by considering the tools of cognitive
bias in a three-part framework. First, government is uniquely justified in leveraging biases to
promote pro-democratic behavior because there is reason to believe humans are subject to
psychological predispositions which promote instead autocracy-supporting behavior. Second,
government is conditionally justified in leveraging biases to accomplish goals traditionally
considered within the scope of government authority. When operating in this second part of the
framework, the government must be transparent about its use of cognitive biases, consider the
ability of affected individuals to overcome leveraged biases, refrain from burdening fundamental
rights, use only biases which are scientifically well established, and ensure that the effects of the
bias to be leveraged are consistent and widespread enough to be usefully leveraged. Finally, the
government is broadly prohibited from leveraging biases to accomplish goals which have not
traditionally been within its purview. Note also that the government has a duty to re-evaluate
existing institutional architecture for bias-triggering features and optimize, eliminate, or
minimize them.
While government may use cognitive biases more freely than violent coercion in most
contexts, there are still limits on the range of available implementations. Cognitive biases have
vast potential as government tools to efficiently and non-coercively adjust behavior on a very
large scale, but policymakers and the people must remain ever mindful of the potential for abuse.
The outlines sketched here are but a beginning to the policy considerations which will emerge as
the science matures and more biases, as well as new discoveries about old ones, come to light.
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Nonetheless, the general principles I have set forth will hopefully serve as a useful starting point
for policymakers seeking to implement bias-leveraging regulations in the near future.
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